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THE FCC AND FIVE YEARS OF THE CABLE
COMMUNICATIONS POLICY ACT OF 1984: TUNING OUT THE
CONSUMER?
I. INTRODUCTION
The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984' (the "Cable Act") was
a comprehensive amendment to the Communications Act of 1934.2 The
Cable Act established the national policy for the regulation of the cable
television industry.3 The focus of the Cable Act and the administrative
rules implementing the act has been on the relationship between
franchising municipal authorities and cable television operators. 4 Con-
gress addressed some consumer issues in the Cable Act5 such as sub-
scriber privacy,6 commercial access channels,7 and public, educational,
and governmental ("PEG") channels."
While Congress and the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC")
assumed that competition between broadcast stations and other compet-
ing video media would eliminate the need for rate regulation of cable sys-
tems,9 the Cable Act, in fact, provided a windfall for cable operators.' 0
1. Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 2, 98 Stat. 2780 (1984) (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-559 (Supp. V
1987)).
2. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-611 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
3. The Cable Act replaced multifarious Federal Communications Commission regulations
and rulings. See infra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
4. The Cable Act was primarily the result of intense lobbying efforts by city and cable
industry representatives. See 130 CONG. REC. S14,283 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984) (statement of
Sen. Goldwater).
"The key to understanding [the Cable Act] is to recognize that it is, above all else, a
compromise [between cities and the cable industry]." Meyerson, The Cable Communica-
tions Policy Act of 1984: A Balancing Act on the Coaxial Wires, 19 GA. L. REv. 543, 545
(1985) (citing 130 CONG. REc. H10,435 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1984) (statement of Rep. Wirth)).
5. For a general discussion of consumer issues addressed by the Cable Act, see McCauley
& Orlando, The Rights of the Consumer Under the Cable Communications Policy Act of
1984, 65 MICH. B.J. 1112 (1986).
6. 47 U.S.C. § 551.
7. Id. § 532.
8. Id. § 531.
9. One stated purpose of the Cable Act is to "promote competition in cable communica-
tions and minimize unnecessary regulation that would impose an undue economic burden on
cable systems." 47 U.S.C. § 521(6); see also 47 U.S.C. § 543(b)(1) (authorizing a franchising
authority to regulate cable system rates only if the system is not subject to "effective com-
petition"); infra text accompanying notes 44-53 (the FCC's assumption that a cable system
is subject to effective competition has created "legal" monopolies which have been
challenged).
Cable television programming includes clear reception of at least several local and distant
broadcast signals, satellite specialty programming and news, sports, music, and educational
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Since the Cable Act deregulated subscriber rates on December 29, 1986,11
those rates have risen sharply.1 2 In addition, rate deregulation has led to
bidding wars for existing "properties," where bidders acquire existing
franchises at ever increasing prices and pay significant financing costs
simply by raising subscriber prices."3
This Note demonstrates how the FCC used the Cable Act to protect
the cable industry and why the courts should invalidate most exclusive
cable franchises. Part II of this Note traces the development of federal
regulation of the cable industry and the federal march toward rate dereg-
ulation. Part II also illustrates how deregulation operates to maximize
cable system revenues at the expense of the consumer welfare. Part III
discusses the mechanics of cable franchising and describes economic ex-
planations and political justifications for creating cable monopolies. Part
IV discusses legal challenges to the franchise process that are designed to
open cable markets to competition, thus suggesting a need for judicial
reexamination or federal statutory reform of the exclusive franchise.
channels. Yet, Congress seems to have accepted the cable industry's proposition that VCR's,
movies, and free broadcast television are effective substitutes for cable's programming.
The other stated purposes of the Cable Act are to:
(1) establish a national policy concerning cable communications;
(2) establish franchise procedures and standards which encourage the growth and
development of cable systems and which assure that cable systems are responsive to
the needs and interests of the local community;
(3) establish guidelines for the exercise of Federal, State, and local authority with
respect to the regulation of cable systems;
(4) assure that cable communications provide and are encouraged to provide the
widest possible diversity of information sources and services to the public;
(5) establish an orderly process for franchise renewal which protects cable opera-
tors against unfair denials of renewal where the operator's past performance and pro-
posal for future performance meet the standards established by [the Cable Act].
47 U.S.C. § 521(1)-(5).
10. This fact seems to indicate that cable's programming choices render alternative video
media inadequate substitutes.
11. The effective date of the Cable Act was December 29, 1984. See Pub. L. No. 98-549 §
9(a), 98 Stat. 2806 (1984). The Cable Act contained a two-year grandfathering period rela-
tive to rate regulation for existing franchises. See 47 U.S.C. § 543(c).
12. Barker, Deregulation Brings Bigger Cable TV Bills Into Sharp Focus, Wash. Post,
Aug. 8, 1989, at D1, col. 1 (basic cable service rates rose 25% nationwide between 1987 and
1988 according to a General Accounting Office report); Cable-TV Cost Rose 6.7% in Six
Months, Survey Says, Wall St. J., Nov. 24, 1987, at 20, col. 2 (basic cable service prices rose
average of 10.6% according to Arthur Andersen & Co. survey).
13. See, e.g., Landro, Market for Cable TV Systems Heats Up, Wall St. J., Mar. 9, 1988,
at 4, col. 1; Landro, Cable TV Systems, Since Deregulation, Are Selling at Increasingly
Higher Prices, Wall St. J., May 19, 1987, at 12, col. 2. Cable industry revenues were $3.6
billion in 1984, $3.6 billion in 1985, $4.5 billion in 1986, and $11.4 billion in 1987. BROAD-
CASTING CABLECASTING Y.B., at D-3 (1985, 1986, 1987, 1988).
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II. MAXIMIZING CABLE REVENUES AT CONSUMER EXPENSE: THE
DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL REGULATION AND LOCAL RATE DEREGULATION
A. Regulation of the Cable Industry Before the Cable Act
The cable television industry began to develop in the 1950's. 14 From the
start, municipalities necessarily regulated certain aspects of local cable
systems because coaxial cable networks used public streets and rights of
ways.15 Moreover, the nature of cable systems is intrinsically local, "in-
volving cable equipment through the public streets and ways, local
franchises, local intra-state advertising and selling of services and local
intra-state collections. In this perspective, a community antenna system
is essentially a local business . . . [and] these [services] are subjects
which lend themselves naturally to local control and supervision." 6
Federal regulation, on the other hand, proceeded in an uncertain direc-
tion.17 Initially, the FCC declined to assert regulatory jurisdiction over
cable on the grounds that it lacked express statutory authority.18 How-
14. At first, the purpose of cable systems was to bring adequate signals of local broadcast
stations to areas with unfavorable reception, either because of distance or adverse terrain.
Early cable system operators typically erected antennas at favorable points of reception,
usually elevated sites, to receive and amplify local broadcast signals. The operators distrib-
uted the signals to subscribers by way of coaxial cable networks. See Frontier Broadcasting
Co. v. Collier, 24 F.C.C. 251, 252 (1958), modified, Carter Mountain Transmission Corp., 32
F.C.C. 459, 465 (1962). Microwave common carrier service enabled cable systems to transmit
to subscribers distant signals which were entirely beyond the range of local antennas. Micro-
wave facilities would receive distant stations at points near their location and relay the sig-
nals to cable system antennas. See Impact of Community Antenna Systems, TV Transla-
tors, TV "Satellite" Stations, and TV "Repeaters" on the Orderly Development of
Television Broadcasting, 26 F.C.C. 403, 408-09, (1959) (inquiry) [hereinafter CATV and TV
Repeater Service]; rev'd on other grounds, Carter Mountain Transmission Corp., 32 F.C.C.
459 (1962) (application), aff'd 321 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 951 (1963); see
also United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 161-64 (1968) (Supreme Court
affirmed FCC jurisdiction over the cable industry).
15. "The transmission of video signals by wires attached to poles on public property in-
vokes the historic power-indeed the responsibility-of state and local governments to en-
sure that public streets [and rights of ways] are used for public purposes." Grow, Cable
Television: Local Governmental Regulation in Perspective, 7 PACE L. REv. 81, 92 (1986)
(citing City of New York v. Rice, 198 N.Y. 124, 91 N.E. 283 (1910); American Rapid Tel. Co.
v. Hess, 125 N.Y. 641, 26 N.E. 919 (1891)).
16. TV Pix, Inc. v. Taylor, 304 F. Supp. 459, 463 (D. Nev. 1968), quoted in Grow, supra
note 15, at 92 n.54.
17. For a discussion of federal regulation in the cable industry, see Grow, supra note 15,
at 86-96 and Wadlow & Wellstein, The Changing Regulatory Terrain of Cable Television,
35 CATH. U.L. REV. 705 (1986).
18. See Frontier Broadcasting Co., 24 F.C.C. at 254 (declining to assert regulatory juris-
diction under title II of the Communications Act, because cable operators are not communi-
cations common carriers), reconsideration denied in conjunction with CATV and TV Re-
peater Service, supra note 14, at 427-28; (declining to assert regulatory jurisdiction, because
cable systems transmit signals by wire, not airwaves, and because the FCC did not have
plenary power over all communications systems).
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ever, in the early 1960s the FCC began to reverse its position. First, the
FCC regulated the licensing of microwave common carriers that relayed
signals from distant broadcast stations to cable system antennas.' Addi-
tionally, the FCC adopted minimum carriage and nonduplication require-
ments for cable systems that received microwave service.20 In 1966, the
FCC expanded these regulations to cover all cable systems. 1
The Supreme Court affirmed the FCC's jurisdiction over the cable in-
dustry two years later in United States v. Southwestern Cable Co.2 The
Court held that cable television was interstate communication, that the
FCC had regulatory authority over all interstate communication by wire
or radio, and that the FCC had reasonably concluded that cable regula-
tions were necessary to carry out statutory objectives relative to the
broadcast industry. 3 Thus, the FCC could regulate the cable industry so
long as the promulgated regulations were "reasonably ancillary to the ef-
fective performance of the Commission's various responsibilities for the
regulation of television broadcasting. '
After the Southwestern decision, the FCC promulgated numerous regu-
lations designed to protect the broadcast industry 5 and to increase pro-
19. See Carter Mountain Transmission Corp., 32 F.C.C. 459, 465 (1962) (application) (de-
nying license to microwave relay facility due to potential adverse economic impact on local
broadcast station), aff'd, 321 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 951 (1963).
20. See Amendment of Subpart L, Part 11, To Adopt Rules and Regulations To Govern
the Grant of Authorizations in the Business Radio Service for Microwave Stations To Relay
Television Signals to Community Antenna Systems, 38 F.C.C. 683 (1965) [hereinafter Rules
re Microwave-Served CATV], aff'd sub nom. Black Hills Video Corp. v. FCC, 399 F.2d 65
(8th Cir. 1968) (adopting regulations applicable only to cable systems that received micro-
wave service). The FCC noted that it "determined as an initial matter that the Communica-
tions Act vests in this agency appropriate rulemaking authority over all CATV systems,
including those which do not use microwave relay service ... ." 38 F.C.C. at 685.
21. See Amendment of Subpart L, Part 91, To Adopt Rules and Regulations To Govern
the Grant of Authorization in the Business Radio Service for Microwave Stations To Relay
Television Signals to Community Antenna Systems, 2 F.C.C.2d 725 (1966) [hereinafter
CATV], aff'd sub nom. Black Hills Video Corp. v. FCC, 399 F.2d 65 (8th Cir. 1968). The
FCC cited 47 U.S.C. § 152(a) among others as authorizing the FCC to regulate all interstate
and foreign communications by wire or radio. 2 F.C.C.2d at 733-34.
22. 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
23. Id. at 173.
24. Id. at 178.
25. See Carter Mountain, 32 F.C.C. at 465 (denying license to microwave relay facility
due to potential adverse economic impact on local broadcast station); see also CATV, supra
note 21, at 725 (extending carriage and nonduplication rules to nonmicrowave-served cable
systems); Rules re Microwave-Served CATV, supra note 20, at 683 (adopting minimum car-
riage and nonduplication requirements for microwave-served systems).
The FCC stated its belief that "the imposition of minimum carriage and nonduplication
requirements by rule is required in order to ameliorate the adverse impact of CATV compe-
tition upon local stations, existing and potential," Rules re Microwave-Served CATV, supra
note 20, at 713, and "to avoid unfair competitive disadvantage to and prejudicial effect on
existing and potential broadcast service." CATV supra note 21 at 745.
[Vol. 24:151
CABLE COMMUNICATIONS POLICY ACT
gram diversity.26 In 1972, the FCC issued comprehensive regulations for
the cable industry." The 1972 regulations consisted of "must carry"
rules,28 distant signal rules, network and syndicated program exclusivity
rules,29 access channel requirements," technical standards,"' cross-owner-
ship rules, 2 and franchising and rate regulation rules.33 This Note focuses
26. See Amendment of Part 74, Subpart K, of the Commission's Rules and Regulations
Relative to Community Antenna Television Systems, 15 F.C.C.2d 417, 421 (1968).
27. See Amendment of Part 74, Subpart K, of the Commission's Rules and Regulations
Relative to Community Antenna Television Systems, 36 F.C.C.2d 143 (1972), [hereinafter
Cable Television Report and Order], aff'd sub nom., American Civil Liberties Union v.
F.C.C., 523 F.2d 1344 (9th Cir. 1975), modified sub nom. Midwest Video Corp. v. F.C.C., 571
F.2d 1025 (8th Cir. 1978). See generally Wadlow & Wellstein, supra note 17, at 708-11
(discussing legal challenges to various cable regulations).
28. See Cable Television Report and Order, supra note 27, at 147-81 (codified at 47
C.F.R. §§ 76.55, .57(a), .59(a), .61(a) (1973)). "Must carry" rules require many cable systems
to transmit upon request certain local broadcast signals. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.56, .58, .62, .64
(1988). The purposes of these rules are to assure carriage of local broadcast signals and to
gauge and ameliorate the competitive impact of distant broadcast stations. Cable Television
Report and Order, supra note 27, at 173. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
ruled that the FCC failed to demonstrate a substantial governmental interest in protecting
local broadcasting and therefore the existing "must carry" regulations were unconstitu-
tional. Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476
U.S. 1169 (1986). Effective July 14, 1989, the FCC deleted all mandatory carriage require-
ments for cable systems. Cable systems were to comply with these requirements by Novem-
ber 1, 1989. 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.5, .53 to .70.
29. See Cable Television Report and Order, supra note 27, at 181-89. Distant signal rules
limit the number of distant signals a cable system can carry depending on the size of the
television market in which the system operates. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.59(b)-(e), .61(b)-(f), .63
(1973), repealed, Cable Television Syndicate Program Exclusivity Rules, 79 F.C.C.2d 663
(1980), repeal aff'd sub nom. Malrite T.V. of N.Y. v. FCC, 652 F.2d 1140 (2d Cir. 1981), cert
denied 454 U.S. 1143 (1982). Network and syndicated program exclusivity rules require
cable systems to delete particular network or syndicated programs if carrying such programs
would duplicate a signal already being transmitted by a local broadcast station. See 47
C.F.R. §§ 76.91, .93, .95, .97, .151, .153, .155, .157, .159 (1973), repealed in part, Cable Tele-
vision Syndicated Program Exclusivity Rules, 79 F.C.C.2d 663 (2d Cir. 1980), repeal afl'd
sub noam. Malrite T.V. of N.Y. v. FCC, 652 F.2d 1140 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1143 (1982).
30. See Cable Television Report and Order, supra note 27, at 189-204 (codified at 47
C.F.R. § 76.251 (1973)) (requiring cable operators to dedicate channels for public, educa-
tional, and governmental (PEG) uses, and channels for leasing to the general public on a
first-come first-serve basis). Without addressing first amendment implications, the Supreme
Court determined that access channel requirements exceeded the FCC's authority because
they imposed common carrier status on cable operators, which section 3(h) of the Federal
Communications Act does not permit. FCC v. Midwest Video Corp. (Midwest II), 440 U.S.
689 (1979), af'g, 571 F.2d 1025 (8th Cir. 1978). The Cable Act contains access channel re-
quirements. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 531-532 (Supp. V 1987).
31. See Cable Television Report and Order, supra note 27, at 198-204 (codified at 47
C.F.R. §§ 76.601, .605, .609, .613, .617 (1973)).
32. 47 C.F.R. § 76.501 (1973). These cross-ownership rules prohibited cable systems from
owning, operating, controlling, or having any interest in networks and broadcast stations.
See id. The Cable Act contains a cross-ownership provision which makes owning a broadcast
station and a cable system in the same community unlawful. 47 U.S.C. § 533(a) (Supp. V
1989]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
on franchising and rate regulation rules which govern cable systems.
B. Disarming Local Regulators: From the FCC's 1972 Rules to the
Cable Act
In promulgating its 1972 rules, the FCC recognized the need for local
involvement resulting from cable's use of streets and ways. The FCC
looked to local authorities since they were able to "bring a special expert-
ness" to franchising and other issues of local concern. 4 The FCC recog-
nized the need for a consistent national cable communications policy.3 5
Consequently, the FCC created a system of dual jurisdiction requiring
cable operators to certify to the FCC that the franchise met certain fed-
eral standards relating to the franchise selection process, construction
deadlines, duration of the franchise, rate regulation, service complaint
procedures, and franchise fees." The rules permitted local governments
to grant franchises, approve initial rates and rate increases, and oversee
subscriber complaints.327
Yet, shortly after these regulations were in place, the FCC moved to
deregulate much of the cable industry. In 1974, the FCC limited local rate
regulation to "regular subscriber service," which consists of only broad-
cast and required access channels."8 The FCC preempted all local rate
regulation of pay-channel services and concluded that "there should be
no regulation of rates for such services at all by any governmental
level."' 9 The FCC's purpose for deregulating pay-channel services was to
avoid a "chilling effect on the anticipated development" of such
services. 4°
In 1977, the FCC repealed virtually all franchise standards contained in
1987). This provision was upheld as not violative of the first amendment in MArsh Media,
Ltd. v. FCC, 798 F.2d 772, 776 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1085 (1987).
33. See Cable Television Report and Order, supra note 27, at 171-210 (codified at 47
C.F.R. § 76.31 (1973)).
34. See id. at 207.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 207-09.
37. See 47 C.F.R. § 76.31(a)(4) -(5) (1973).
38. Amendment of Part 76 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations Relative to the
Advisability of Federal Preemption of Cable Television Technical Standards or the Imposi-
tion of a Moratorium on NonFederal Standards, 46 F.C.C.2d 175, 199 (1974) [hereinafter
Cable Television] (codified at 47 C.F.R. § 76.31 (1975)).
39. Id. The preempted rates included distant broadcast imports, satellite delivered pro-
gram service such as HBO, Showtime, The Movie Channel, BET, MTV, Nickelodeon, CBN,
CNN, and any other video alternatives. See Community Cable TV, Inc., 95 F.C.C.2d 1204,
1215-17 (1983) (upholding preemption concerning satellite delivery as well as specialized
and auxiliary program service).
40. Cable Television, supra note 38, at 199-200. The FCC's authority to preempt local
rate regulation was upheld in Brookhaven Cable TV, Inc. v. Kelly, 573 F.2d 765, 767 (2d Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 904 (1979).
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the 1972 rules.41 Local authorities were still permitted to directly regulate
regular subscriber rates. An indirect means of regulating subscriber rates
and services involved a type of quid pro quo where municipalities granted
cable operators an exclusive franchise in exchange for some control over
rates and services. 2 The Cable Act and the FCC eliminated both of these
vehicles for public regulation.
C. Rate Deregulation Under the Cable Act
When Congress enacted the Cable Act, the FCC asserted its longstand-
ing policy of preempting state or local rate regulation of cable, and al-
lowing the free market to set subscriber rates.4 3 Under the Cable Act, no
franchising authority may regulate the rates for the provision of cable
service, or any other conimunications service provided over a cable sys-
tem to cable subscribers, except for basic cable services where a cable
system is not subject to effective competition.""
The cable market is anything but a free market. The FCC's position is
that a cable system is subject to effective competition, and therefore is
exempt from local rate regulation, if three or more broadcast television
signals are available in the cable community.4 Since nearly every commu-
nity receives at least three signals, nearly every community is subject to
effective competition. Customarily, though, only one cable operator pro-
vides cable service in a community, often with a legal monopoly.46 Yet, by
FCC fiat, that cable monopoly is subject to "effective competition" and
exempt from rate regulation.
The new deregulatory rate scheme was challenged by numerous groups
including the National League of Cities in American Civil Liberties
Union v. FCC.47 Opponents of the Cable Act and the FCC claimed the
FCC's definition of effective competition was so broad that few, if any,
communities could regulate rates. Nevertheless, the ACLU court ruled
that since the Cable Act failed to establish guidelines on what factors the
FCC should use to determine effective competition, and since the legisla-
tive history merely suggested that the FCC should consider a variety of
factors, the effective competition definition was "at a minimum
41. See Amendment of Subparts B and C of Part 76 of the Commission's Rules Pertain-
ing to Applications for Certificates of Compliance and Federal-State/Local Regulatory Rela-
tionships, 66 F.C.C.2d 380, 391 (1977) (codified at 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.13, .31 (1978).
42. See infra text accompanying notes 66-68.
43. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
44. 47 U.S.C. § 543 (a)-(b) (Supp. V 1987). "Basic cable service" means any service tier
which includes the transmission of local television broadcast signals. Id. § 522(2) (Supp. V
1987).
45. 47 C.F.R. § 76.33(a)(2) (1988).
46. See infra note 59 and accompanying text.
47. 823 F.2d 1554 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1220 (1988).
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'reasonable.' ""
The ACLU court did find the signal availability test to be "arbitrary
and capricious. '49 Under the signal availability test, every signal which
placed a Grade B contour"0 over any portion of the cable community or
which was significantly viewed within the cable community was counted
as available.5 1 The ACLU court, however, found no justification for con-
sidering as available to the whole community a signal which might only in
fact be available to a small part of the community.2
In redefining effective competition after ACLU, the FCC adhered to its
basic policy position of rate deregulation and protection of the cable in-
dustry. The FCC adopted new rules which deem a cable system subject to
effective competition where three signals were available over all the com-
munity.5 3 While a few additional communities might be permitted to reg-
ulate cable systems under the new definition, the FCC's all-inclusive defi-
nition of effective competition means most cable operators are still free to
set prices in a protected market.
III. CABLE FRANCHISING: CREATING THE CABLE MONOPOLY
The FCC's entrenched policy of protection for cable operators through
preemption means that consumers must look beyond the local regulator
for protection. Arguably, consumer interests in diverse programming,
quality service, and reasonable prices will be achieved where cable opera-
tors in fact compete directly with other cable operators in the same com-
munity. Despite the predominance of protected markets, some cable op-
erators are willing to compete with other cable operators if given the
opportunity.54 Before discussing legal challenges to the franchise process
that would open protected markets to competition, an explanation of the
mechanics of cable franchising and frequently expressed economic expla-
nations and political justifications for monopolies is necessary.
48. Id. at 1564. Petitioners argued that FCC rate regulations were arbitrary and capri-
cious in definitions and criteria regarding "effective competition." Id.
49. Id. at 1571-73. The signal availability test was used to determine how to measure
when a signal was available in a community. Id. at 1573.
50. A Grade B contour is one of two field strength contours. Field strength contours indi-
cate the approximate extent of coverage over average terrain in the absence of interference
from other television stations. See 47 C.F.R. § 76.683 (1988).
51. See 47 C.F.R. § 76.33(a)(2) (1988).
52. ACLU, 823 F.2d at 1572-73.
53. Amendment of Parts 1, 63, and 76 of the Commission's Rules to Implement the Provi-
sions of the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 3 F.C.C. Rec. No. 9, 2617 (1988).
54. See, e.g., Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (Preferred I), 754
F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 1985), aff'd in part and remanded, 476 U.S. 488 (1986).
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A. The Mechanics of Franchising
The Cable Act requires all cable operators to obtain a franchise. 55 Typi-
cally, a franchising authority issues a request for proposals ("RFP")
which sets forth facility and equipment requirements relating to the es-
tablishment or operation of a cable system56 which the authority has
deemed important. The franchising authority considers submitted pro-
posals, and after making its franchise selection, authorizes construction of
a system over public rights-of-way and through easements. 57 The Cable
Act authorizes a franchising authority to impose a franchise fee on a cable
operator of up to five percent of gross revenues.
58
B. The "Why's" and "How's" of Cable Monopolies
The most striking characteristic of the cable television market is the
omnipresence of the exclusive franchise.59 One cable franchise litigation
participant noted, "[I]n virtually every community in the country, cable
systems receive a monopoly franchise from local governments. It is in fact
a monopoly, even though it is almost always decorated with the sham
label of 'non-exclusive franchise.' "0 Few agree on the explanation or jus-
tification for the success of the cable industry in erecting legal barriers.
1. The Economics of Cable Television: A Natural Monopoly?
The cable market is most commonly described as a natural monopoly.
Traditionally, a natural monopoly is said to exist where there are econo-
mies of scale so persistent that the entire demand within a relevant mar-
ket can be satisfied at a lower unit cost by one firm rather than by two or
more firms.6 1 Under the economy of scale theory, a cable monopoly will
develop in a given area because the larger a system's market share, the
lower the average cost of production becomes. Smaller systems thus com-
pete at a disadvantage and will exit the market until only one firm
remains.
55. 47 U.S.C. § 541(b)(1) (Supp. V 1987).
56. Id. § 544(b).
57. Id. § 541(a)(1)-(2).
58. Id. § 542(a)-(b).
59. "[O]ver 99% of the cable systems do not face direct competition from another cable
system for subscribers." Meyerson, supra note 4, at 552 n.57 (citing Dawson, How Safe is
Cable's Natural Monopoly?, CABLEVISION, June 1, 1981, at 340).
60. Schildhause, Preferred Communications: Preamble to Breakup of Local Cable
Franchising?, 7 PACE L. REv. 1, 2 (1986) (citing CATO Institute, Policy Analysis, Mar. 13,
1984, at 4).
61. Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REV. 548, 548 (1969).
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A more modern approach to natural monopoly focuses on market con-
testability.2 According to the market contestability theory, cable systems
will exhibit competitive pricing unless capital is unable to freely enter
and exit the market.6 3 Theoretically, a natural monopoly would develop
where capital costs of cable systems are high upon entrance and un-
salvageable upon exit.64 Whether the market in fact corresponds to either
of these economic theories is a subject of debate. The answer is usually
determined by the desired outcome.
2. Justifying the Cable Monopoly: The Magic of the Cable Lobby
In most instances, municipalities grant exclusive franchises on either a
de facto or a de jure basis. Both the industry and municipalities assert
numerous justifications for granting these exclusive franchises.
a. Consumer Protection: The Public Utilities Argument
The traditional justification for granting exclusive franchises relies on
the fact that the cable industry exhibits natural monopoly characteris-
tics. 5 The theory postulates that a cable market will automatically create
a monopoly and that the monopoly will then set higher prices and pro-
vide subcompetitive services. 6 To prevent such a market condition, Pro-
fessor (now Judge) Posner suggests that "[a] local community, as a condi-
tion to permitting a particular CATV operator the use of public rights-of-
way, could bargain with it over the level of rates that the operator would
charge subscribers in the community. ' ' 67 Therefore, cable operators would
have an incentive to bid for the franchise and to accept lower prices in
order to be the sole operator chosen. 8
Professor Hazlett contends, however, that regardless of the merits of
Professor Posner's economic analysis, the proposition fails on its own
terms because the FCC has preempted almost every community's author-
ity to regulate cable rates. 9 Though a municipality can grant an exclusive
franchise, it can no longer bargain on behalf of the consumer.
62. Hazlett, Private Monopoly and the Public Interest: An Economic Analysis of the
Cable Television Franchise, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1335, 1342 (1986).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See id. at 1338.
66. See Posner, supra note 61, at 642.
67. Id. at 643.
68. See id.
69. Hazlett, supra note 62, at 1347.
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b. Preventing the Misallocation of Resources
Another justification for granting monopoly franchises also rests on the
natural monopoly theory. This argument was asserted by Judge Posner in
Omega Satellite Products Co. v. City of Indianapolis.70 Judge Posner ar-
gued that if a natural monopoly existed and two or more operators were
allowed to compete, then more than one cable grid would be built, but
only one operator would survive.7 1 Under this line of reasoning, in order
to prevent "wasteful duplication of facilities," a municipality should grant
one exclusive franchise to the most efficient operator.7 2
c. The Medium Scarcity Rationale
Still another justification relies on the analogy of cable media to broad-
cast media by comparing limited space on poles and in easements used by
cable systems to the limited space on the electromagnetic spectrum that
broadcast stations use.73 Medium scarcity, which alludes to the inherent
physical limitations that exist on the number of users of a communica-
tions medium, has been a constitutionally permissible rationale for regu-
lating the radio and broadcast industry since National Broadcasting Co.
v. United States.74 In such instances, first amendment principles are fur-
thered by having the government allocate these limited resources to select
users, with no one having a first amendment right to be the particular
person selected.75
In reality, the cable-broadcast analogy is tenuous at best. First, most
exclusive cable franchises are granted, even though ample space remains
on poles and in easements. Second, signals transmitted along two cable
wires side-by-side do not interfere with each other, whereas every broad-
cast signal interferes with every other broadcast signal in the spectrum.
d. Preventing Public Disruption
A different justification for granting exclusive franchises deals with the
authority of localities to oversee the use of public streets and rights-of-
way. According to the public disruption justification, since building a
cable grid often entails digging up streets and constructing lines along
easements, local regulators should exercise their police powers to ensure
70. 694 F.2d 119, 126 (7th Cir. 1982).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See, e.g., Community Communications, Inc. v. City of Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370, 1378
(10th Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed, 456 U.S. 1001 (1982).
74. 319 U.S. 190, 226 (1943).
75. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389 (1969) (wireless broadcast
"licensee has no constitutional right to be the one who holds the license").
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that disruption of the public domain is minimized."6 Since an exclusive
franchise would require the building of only one cable grid instead of two
or more grids, disruption of the public streets will be minimized by the
granting of an exclusive franchise.
e. Accumulating "Hidden" Revenue: The Franchise Fee
An additional justification for granting exclusive franchises is that lo-
calities are able to raise general revenues through a franchise fee. The
Cable Act authorizes franchising authorities to impose franchise fees on
cable operators for up to five percent of gross revenues. 7 The costs to
localities of granting and regulating cable franchises, however, are mini-
mal. Therefore, localities raise general revenue by a hidden tax. Indeed,
localities have an interest in bargaining with operators to offer exclusive
franchises and in extracting the five percent maximum. Localities also
have an interest in allowing exclusive franchisees to charge monopoly
prices, thereby raising gross revenues and total franchise fees. While this
justification is rarely made public, it certainly factors into the rationale of
local regulators.
Known pejoratively as accumulating "hidden" revenue, the constitu-
tionality of this practice was tested and upheld in Erie Telecommunica-
tions, Inc. v. City of Erie78 and Group W, Cable, Inc. v. City of Santa
Cruz.7 9 In both Erie and Group W, local franchisees claimed that the first
amendment prohibits franchising authorities from imposing franchise fees
in excess of the legitimate costs of granting and regulating the franchise.8
The franchisees cited Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota
Commissioner of Revenue,"1 which struck down a general revenue tax on
paper and ink." The local franchisees argued that fees over and above
regulatory costs illegally singled them out as cable operators and condi-
tioned their exercise of free speech on the payment of a tax. 3
In ruling that the fees were permissible, both trial courts distinguished
Minneapolis Star and relied on Gannett Satellite Information Network,
Inc. v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority."4 Gannett upheld a reve-
nue-raising fee imposed on newspaper vending machines in Metropolitan
Transportation Authority ("MTA") stations because the government was
76. See, e.g. Community Communications, Inc., 660 F.2d at 1379.
77. 47 U.S.C. § 542(a) (Supp. V 1987).
78. 659 F. Supp. 580 (W.D. Pa. 1987), afl'd on other grounds, 853 F.2d 1084 (3d Cir.
1988).
79. 669 F. Supp. 954 (N.D. Cal. 1987) reh'g denied, 679 F. Supp. 977 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
80. Erie, 659 F. Supp. at 594; Group W, 669 F. Supp. at 972.
81. 460 U.S. 575 (1983).
82. Id. at 593.
83. Erie, 659 F. Supp. at 594; Group W, 669 F. Supp. at 972.
84. 745 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1984).
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doing nothing more than acting in a proprietary context in renting space
it owned.85 The Erie and Group W courts held that the franchise fee was
like the fee in Gannett, which was little more than the permissible prac-
tice of receiving reasonable compensation for rental of property owned by
the public.8 The precedential value of the Erie opinion is only persua-
sive; the Third Circuit affirmed on waiver grounds and stated specifically
that it did so to avoid ruling on a constitutional issue."7 Nevertheless, the
two opinions are early indications that the five percent maximum
franchise fee can be constitutionally used as a general revenue-raising
measure.
IV. OPENING CABLE MARKETS: CHALLENGING THE FRANCHISE PROCESS
Since the Cable Act and the FCC definition of effective competition
protect the cable industry by preempting local rate regulation, consumers
can only hope that free market competition will protect their interests in
diverse programming, quality service, and reasonable subscription rates.
But as discussed earlier, the cable market is anything but a free market in
which cable operators compete head-to-head in the same area for the
same customers.8 8 In attempts to open the cable market, some cable oper-
ators who have been denied franchises have brought suit against localities
and exclusive franchisees, seeking invalidation of exclusive franchises,
treble damages under federal antitrust law, and monetary and injunctive
relief under 42 U.S.C. § 198389 for first amendment violations.
A. Antitrust Actions Against Franchising Authorities and Exclusive
Franchisees
Arguably, exclusive cable franchises are contracts between municipali-
ties and cable operators to restrain trade and are thus per se violations of
section one of the Sherman Act.90 According to this line of reasoning, fed-
eral antitrust laws would permit cable operators who have been denied
access to closed markets to seek damages from both municipalities and
85. Id. at 775.
86. Erie, 659 F. Supp. at 594; Group W, 669 F. Supp. at 973.
87. Erie Telecommunications v. City of Erie, 853 F.2d 1084, 1092-93 (3d Cir. 1988), af'g
on other grounds 659 F. Supp. 580 (W.D. Pa. 1987). The circuit court ruled that the first
amendment rights of cable operators were evident in 1984 for waiver purposes, and activity
in previous lawsuits relating to franchise agreements at that time served as waiver of first
amendment rights. Id. at 1099. Presumably, this would mean the first amendment rights of
cable operators were clear in 1984 for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
88. See supra text accompanying notes 44-46.
89. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
90. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988). The Sherman Act provides in part that "[E]very contract, com-
bination ... or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States...
is declared to be illegal .... Id.
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exclusive franchisees and to enter the closed cable markets. Proponents of
cable overbuild, a situation created by overlapping cable grids owned by
two or more competing operators in one area, were heartened by the Su-
preme Court's decision in Community Communications, Inc. v. City of
Boulder,9 though only for a short time.
In City of Boulder, Boulder perceived the expansion of a cable com-
pany's service area as a threat to a potential exclusive franchise, and
therefore attempted to prevent the expansion. However, the Court re-
fused to grant Boulder antitrust immunity under the Parker doctrine.92
Parker v. Brown,93 relying on principles of federalism, established that
state legislation mandating anticompetitive behavior does not violate fed-
eral antitrust laws.94 In City of Boulder, the Court stated that the Parker
doctrine immunizes "municipal conduct engaged in 'pursuant to state
policy to displace competition with regulation or monopoly public ser-
vice.' ,5 On the facts of City of Boulder, however, the Court could find
no "clear articulation and affirmative expression" of a state policy or leg-
islation to displace competition, and held that the general grant of au-
thority given to Boulder under the home rule was insufficient to justify
antitrust immunity.""
While City of Boulder was seen as a tool to challenge exclusive
franchises, it was hardly what disaffected cable operators needed to open
cable markets on a wide scale, for four reasons. First, eager to provide
maximum flexibility to their localities, states either already had or
quickly passed legislation to immunize local government officials under
the Parker doctrine.9 7 Thus, the impact of City of Boulder was limited.
Second, Congress passed the Local Government Antitrust Act of 198498
which prohibits the awarding of damages to plaintiffs if an antitrust vio-
lation results from the action of or direction by a local government. In
91. 455 U.S. 40 (1982). The result of the decision was to place potential competitors at a
disadvantage. Id. at 45 n.6. However, the Court's holding reasonably could have created
liability for both municipalities and exclusive franchisees under the Sherman Act for an-
ticompetitive behavior.
92. Id. at 45-46.
93. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
94. We find nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its history which suggests
that its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities directed
by its legislature. In a dual system of government in which, under the Constitution,
the states are sovereign, save only as Congress may constitutionally subtract from
their authority, an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's control over its officers
and agents is not lightly to be attributed to Congress.
City of Boulder, 455 U.S. at 49 (quoting Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-51 (1943)).
95. Id. at 51 (quoting City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 413
(1978)).
96. Id. at 55.
97. See, e.g., VA CODE ANN. § 15.1-23.1 (Repl. Vol. 1989).
98. Pub. L. No. 98-544, 98 Stat. 2750 (1984) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 34-36 (1988).
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City Communications, Inc. v. City of Detroit,99 the court determined that
the exclusive franchisee is entitled to immunity from the antitrust laws as
long as the effective "decision maker" is the municipality rather than the
private parties. 10 0 Since City Communications could not show corruption
or a delegation of the decision making function, the district court held
Detroit to be the effective decision maker, thereby immunizing the exclu-
sive franchisee. 101
Third, while the Parker doctrine and the Local Government Antitrust
Act shield states, localities, and their public or private agents, the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine protects purely private individuals, including mo-
nopoly cable franchisees. The Noerr-Pennington doctrine arose out of
two Supreme Court decisions, Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v.
Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. 0 2 and United Mine Workers of America v.
Pennington.10 3 These cases hold that individuals or organizations have a
constitutionally protected right to petition the government for favorable
treatment, even if such action was motivated by or would amount to a
Sherman Act violation. 0 4
The Noerr-Pennington exception to antitrust liability was held to ap-
ply to cable operators seeking exclusive franchises in Hopkinsville Cable
TV, Inc. v. Pennyroyal Cablevision, Inc.'0 5 In Hopkinsville, a cable oper-
ator received a "nonexclusive" franchise and was protected from antitrust
liability when sued by a competitor who was denied a franchise. 08
Of course, a sham exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine exists.' 07
For example, the Eighth Circuit upheld a jury award of $10,800,000 in
antitrust damages in Central Telecommunications, Inc. v. TCI Cablevi-
sion.108 In Central Telecommunications, the successful bidder used illegal
influence to win an exclusive franchise, and the trial court applied the
sham exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. 0 9 The appellate court
stated that since the successful bidder's intent was not to influence gov-
99. 695 F. Supp. 911 (E.D. Mich. 1988), aff'g 650 F. Supp. 1570 (E.D. Mich. 1987).
100. See id. 914.
101. Id. at 914-16.
102. 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
103. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
104. See Pennington, 381 U.S. at 669-72; Noerr Motor, 365 U.S. at 135.
105. 562 F. Supp. 543 (W.D. Ky. 1982).
106. Id. at 545-48.
107. There may be situations in which a publicity campaign, ostensibly directed toward
influencing governmental action, is a mere sham to cover what is actually nothing
more than an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a com-
petitor and the application of the Sherman Act would be justified.
Noerr Motor, 365 U.S. at 144.
108. 800 F.2d 711 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 910 (1987).
109. Id. at 724.
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ernment, but rather to injure a competitor, the sham exception applied.11
However, cases like Central Telecommunications are really instances of
improper lobby activities, conflicts of interest, and breaches of public
trust rather than genuine attempts to open closed cable markets.
Finally, the Cable Act is ambiguous in its discussion of the issues of
awarding one or more franchises within its jurisdiction."' On one hand,
the House Report contains the statement that the statute "does not...
revise the Federal antitrust law."" 2 On the other hand, the Cable Act
states that a franchising authority "may award . . [one] or more
franchises within its jurisdiction."" 3 Seemingly, if Congress intended this
section to preempt federal antitrust laws, it would have been more ex-
plicit. However, one commentator suggests that "since the plain meaning
of the statute seems to grant the franchising authority the discretionary
power to choose the number of franchises, most exclusive franchises prob-
ably will be validated.' 114
Given the vast array of exceptions and limitations which have swal-
lowed the antitrust rules, and given the ambiguity surrounding the Cable
Act itself, disappointed cable bidders have focused franchise litigation on
first amendment principles. Yet the Supreme Court has afforded the cir-
cuits little guidance in applying first amendment principles.
B. Implicating the First Amendment
The Supreme Court held that cable operators are entitled to first
amendment protection in City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communica-
tions, Inc. (Preferred II)."1 However, the Court specifically left open the
question of which first amendment standard to apply in evaluating
franchise process regulations." 6 Different news media have received dif-
ferent degrees of first amendment protection. For example, broadcast me-
dia are subject to extensive federal regulation, justified by physical scar-
city, due to the inherent limitation of the electromagnetic spectrum to
accommodate only a certain number of users."" In contrast, print media
have received broad protection from governmental interference."'
110. Id. at 723.
111. 47 U.S.C. § 541(a) (Supp. V 1987).
112. H.R. REP. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 59, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 4655, 4696 (1984); see Meyerson, supra note 4, at 552-53.
113. 47 U.S.C. § 541(a).
114. Meyerson, supra note 4, at 553.
115. 476 U.S. 488 (1986).
116. Id. at 496 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
117. See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389 (1968); National
Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226 (1943).
118. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) ("right of
reply" statute held to violate first amendment rights of a newspaper).
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In Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (Preferred
),"' Preferred, a disaffected cable franchisee, challenged the granting of
single franchises on first amendment grounds.120 In reversing the lower
court's dismissal of the case, the Ninth Circuit stated that cable operators
have greater protection from regulation than broadcast media. 2' Conse-
quently, it applied the strict test articulated in United States v.
O'Brien,'12 2 to weigh regulation of non-communicative aspects of first
amendment conduct.12 3 The Supreme Court, while upholding the judg-
ment and remanding the case to the trial court, did not decide "whether
the characteristics of cable television make it sufficiently analogous to an-
other medium to warrant application of an already existing standard or
whether those characteristics require a new analysis.' 24
1. Circuit Split on Appropriate First Amendment Standard
Three circuits have applied simple balancing tests to determine if sin-
gle franchises violate cable operators' first amendment rights. In Commu-
nity Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 25 the Tenth Circuit bal-
anced a cable operator's interest in communicating against the
franchising authority's need to minimize disruption of public resources,
and upheld the regulation of entry into the market."6 In Omega Satellite
Products v. City of Indianapolis,"2' the Seventh Circuit balanced an op-
erator's interest against the burden to public resources and, given that
cable is a natural monopoly, upheld regulation of entry." s In Central
Telecommunications, Inc. v. TCI Cablevision, Inc.,"92 the Eighth Circuit,
though refusing to reach the first amendment issue because of antitrust
claims, accepted the Tenth and Seventh Circuits' rationale and upheld
regulation."30
Particularly troublesome about these three cases is the courts' reliance
on protecting consumer welfare by regulating natural monopolies and
minimizing disruption of the public domain. The former can no longer be
119. 754 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 1985), aff'd in part and remanded, 476 U.S. 488 (1986).
120. Id. at 1401.
121. See id. at 1403.
122. 391 U.S. 367, 377, reh'g denied, 393 U.S. 900 (1968). The test required the Court to
consider the constitutional power of the government, the government's interest in the case,
the relationship between the government's interest and the suppression of expression, and
the degree of restriction of freedom of expression. Id.
123. Preferred I, 754 F.2d at 1405-06.
124. Preferred II, 476 U.S. at 496 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
125. 660 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed, 456 U.S. 1001 (1982).
126. Id. at 1375-80.
127. 694 F.2d 119 (7th Cir. 1982).
128. Id. at 127-29.
129. 800 F.2d 711 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 910 (1987).
130. Id. at 713-17.
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a basis for regulation, since most localities cannot regulate the rates of
cable systems.1 3 ' The latter requires restrictions that have no rational
nexus with the goal of minimizing disruption. Since one cable system
should disrupt the public domain no more than any other system would,
some other criteria must be used to select the one operator that will re-
ceive the exclusive franchise.
2. Ninth Circuit O'Brien Test: Gaining Momentum?
While all out of the Ninth Circuit, three recent cases since Preferred I
and Preferred 11-Century Federal, Inc. v. City of Palo Alto, 32 Group W
Cable, Inc. v. City of Santa Cruz,"'s and Pacific West Cable Co. v. City of
Sacramento"4-point to a rejection of the simple balancing test, in favor
of the O'Brien test.""5 All three cases involved cable operators who were
denied franchises in favor of competing operators, who received either de
jure or de facto exclusive franchises."' Each plaintiff challenged the
franchise processes of the cities which resulted in the selection of single
cable franchisees."17 In each case, the district courts held that the first
amendment gives as much protection to cable media as to print media.
The courts applied the O'Brien test, and held that as a matter of law
exclusive cable franchise processes did not further substantial govern-
mental interests.' s8 This stricter O'Brien test is beneficial in that it has
none of the disadvantages of the simple balancing test described above,"19
and it will afford a higher degree of protection for first amendment con-
duct until the Supreme Court clearly articulates a guiding principle.
C. Congressional Reform on the Horizon?
The Cable Act and the FCC's definition of "effective competition '"'4
have often stifled cable competition, and the courts have refused to inval-
idate cable monopolies under antitrust laws and the first amendment.
These limitations have caused consumer pressure on some members of
Congress, leading to the introduction of three bills which would restore
131. See supra text accompanying notes 44-53.
132. 648 F. Supp. 1465 (N.D. Cal. 1986), appeal dismissed, 108 S. Ct. 1002 (1988).
133. 669 F. Supp. 954 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
134. 672 F. Supp. 1322 (E.D. Cal. 1987).
135. See Pacific West, 672 F. Supp. at 1332; Group W, 669 F. Supp. at 962; Century
Federal, 648 F. Supp. at 1475.
136. Pacific West, 672 F. Supp. at 1325; Group W, 669 F. Supp. at 957-58; Century Fed-
eral, 648 F. Supp. at 1467.
137. Pacific West, 672 F. Supp. at 1330; Group W, 669 F. Supp. at 957-58; Century Fed-
eral, 648 F. Supp. at 1467-68.
138. Pacific West, 672 F. Supp. at 1332-41; Group W, 669 F. Supp. at 962-966; Century
Federal, 648 F. Supp. at 1474-79.
139. See supra text accompanying note 122.
140. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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rate-setting authority to local governments."" Congress needed several
years to pass the Cable Act, and new legislation will likely meet resistance
from the cable lobby. In addition, the scope and complexity of the issues
suggest that legislation will undergo many permutations. At the same
time, the severity of the consumer's problem suggests that some form of
restoration of rate-setting authority will emerge.
Senate Bill 805'"' has four primary components. First, section 3 of the
bill terminates the limitations that 47 U.S.C. § 543143 places on states and
franchise authorities to regulate rates, permits states to confer common
carrier status on cable systems, and after notice and an opportunity for a
hearing, permits states and franchising authorities to change cable rates if
a cable system rearranges a service tier.14 4 Arguably, the permissible rate
regulation could extend to all satellite delivered program services such as
HBO, Showtime, MTV, and the like. This result is possible because the
Cable Act was a comprehensive policy and regulatory act, thereby super-
ceding the earlier FCC preemption of non-basic cable services. 14 5 Thus,
the bill's specific repeal of the comprehensive limitations in the Cable Act
could allow states and franchise authorities to regulate the rates of all
aspects of cable service. Second, section 4 of the bill permits states and
franchise authorities to review ownership patterns and deny franchise re-
newal or transfer of ownership or control of a cable system on the ground
of extensive media ownership. 46 Third, section 5 links a system's copy-
right protection to old "must-carry" regulations.1 47
Senate Bill 1068 provides additional assistance in franchising regula-
tions." 8 First, section 3 of the bill would permit a state or franchising
authority to regulate, in areas not being served by at least two "lifeline"
service cable operators, who essentially provide the basic cable service
tier.' 0 Second, section 4 of the bill authorizes telephone companies to
provide video and cable services, with the rationale that telephone com-
panies could become sources of competition for entrenched cable sys-
tems.1 0 This section also authorizes the FCC to prescribe regulations that
allocate costs in a manner which protects basic ratepayers from cross-
141. S. 1068, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REc. S5692-94 (daily ed. May 18, 1989); S.
805, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REc. S4727-28 (daily ed. May 3, 1989); H.R. 1304,
101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REc. H563 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 1989).
H.R. 1304 was not reprinted in the Congressional Record upon its introduction and is not
discussed here.
142. S. 805, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 135 CONG. REc. S4727-28 (daily ed. May 3, 1989).
143. 47 U.S.C. § 543 (Supp. V 1987).
144. S. 805 at § 3.
145. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
146. S. 805, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 4, 135 CONG. REc. S4728 (daily ed. May 3, 1989).
147. Id. § 5.
148. See S. 1068 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REc. S5693 (daily ed. May 18, 1989).
149. Id. § 3.
150. Id. § 4, 135 CONG. REc. 85693.
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subsidization of cable service.151 Third, section 5 requires cable operators
to provide access to their systems on a nondiscriminatory basis to all pro-
gram services, unless precluded from doing so by capacity or unaccept-
able program content.'52 Fourth, section 6 requires programming services
that are affiliated with a cable operator to be made available to all pro-
gramming distributors on a nondiscriminatory basis. 53 "This provision is
aimed at addressing the complaints of [owners and users] of satellite
[dishes] and wireless [cable, satellite dishes, SMATV, and the like] . . .
who are denied the right[s] to purchase programming at competitive
rates."' 54
V. CONCLUSION
Though touted as a pro-consumer compromise between municipalities
and the cable industry, the Cable Act had anti-consumer effects and re-
sulted in outright protectionism of established cable companies. The FCC
moved to protect cable interests by eliminating the ability of local regula-
tors to bargain on behalf of consumers. Federal antitrust laws failed to
achieve their stated purposes because of broad exceptions and protection-
ist legislation. It is possible, through the first amendment, that the Con-
stitution will effectuate what Congress and the FCC should have done
long ago, namely, open the cable markets. Fortunately for consumers,
Congress will also likely return some form of rate-setting authority to
states and franchising authorities.
Mark R. Herring
151. Id.
152. Id. § 5.
153. Id. § 6.
154. 135 CONG. REC. S5694 (daily ed. May 18, 1989) (statement of Sen. Gorton).
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